Sovereignty and engagement without recognition:explaining the failure of conflict resolution in Cyprus by Kyris, George
 
 
University of Birmingham
Sovereignty and engagement without recognition
Kyris, George
DOI:
10.1080/17449057.2018.1495364
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Kyris, G 2018, 'Sovereignty and engagement without recognition: explaining the failure of conflict resolution in
Cyprus', Ethnopolitics, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 426-442. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1495364
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Checked for eligibility: 27/09/2018
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Ethnopolitics on 25/07/2018, available online:
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17449057.2018.1495364"
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Sovereignty and Engagement without Recognition: Explaining the Failure 
of Conflict Resolution in Cyprus 
 
George Kyris 
• Please cite: Kyris, G. 2018. Sovereignty and Engagement Without Recognition: 
Explaining the Failure of Conflict Resolution in Cyprus, Ethnopolitics, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1495364 
 
 
Abstract 
This article explores if and how UN and EU engagement without recognition with the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has failed to promote the resolution of the 
Cyprus conflict. In more specific, the paper traces the process via which ideas of sovereignty 
impact the approach of those organisations towards Cyprus and their engagement with the de 
facto state of TRNC and the consequent impact on the conflict. I find that sovereignty plays a 
major role in the approach of the UN and the EU towards the Cyprus conflict and the TRNC 
because of normative pressures and because of how the norm is evoked from the side of the 
parent state, Republic of Cyprus. As a result, I find that engagement without recognition 
results in failure of conflict resolution because it leads to intransigence to both the parent and 
the de facto state but also because it undermines broader reconciliation and the chances to 
create conditions favourable to a successful settlement. These are important lessons for the 
discussion on the range of international responses to failed secession, and especially the 
impact of sovereignty ideas and the limitations of engagement without recognition, a strategy 
increasingly deployed with reference to de facto states. 
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Introduction 
 
While secession has been a popular topic within studies of international politics, there is a 
relatively more recent interest on failed secession and, particularly, the resulting emergence 
of  de facto states, i.e. self-declared states that display a certain degree of conventionally 
understood characteristics of statehood (population, territory, a government) but they are not 
recognised by a significant part of the international community.1 In some respects, this is a 
result of a range of failed secession attempts in the Post-Soviet space, although the above 
definition yields a population of de facto states that also includes Somaliland, Kosovo, 
Taiwan, possibly Western Sahara and Palestine and, finally, the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus2- the focus of this paper. A small number of more recent studies has 
focused on the so-called ‘engagement without recognition’, the practice that international 
actors develop in dealing with those entities while at the same time refraining from 
recognising them. However, studies remain limited, especially on the role of international 
organisations (IOs), which are often the main actors in promoting the resolution of conflicts, 
including those that relate to de facto states. What is more, the fact that all existing de facto 
1 This definition looks at cases of relatively populated and consolidated de facto states (older than two years- see 
also Caspersen 2012 and Kolstø 2006 on this) with a degree of de facto territorial control and government- 
hence why the term ‘de facto’ is prioritised over other terms, such as ‘contested’ or ‘unrecognised’ states. This 
focus allows testing how does the EU react at the presence of an entity that, although has some de facto state 
attributes remains unrecognised. The definition does not include examples of political entities that are part of 
recognised state structures, even if secession is or has been their objective (e.g. Iraqi Kurdistan, Republika 
Srpska). In contested statehood terms and similarly to other works before (e.g. Geldenhuys 2009), the source of 
contestation here is external, i.e. the international community, rather than internal, e.g. the locals. Throughout 
the text I use the terms ‘de facto’ and ‘self-declared’ states interchangeably. 
2 Here I adopt a relatively broad definition of secession, which includes outcomes of decolonisation (see also 
Griffiths 2016). In this regard, the article is relevant also to cases such as Palestine or Western Sahara, which 
emerged more as a result of decolonisation processes rather than a clear secession from an existing parent state 
in the way it is understood in the post-colonial era (like in the majority of de facto states). 
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states relate to unresolved conflicts raises questions about the ability of IOs to manage 
conflict and the significance of engagement without recognition in this context. 
 
In this regard, this paper explores if and how UN and EU engagement without recognition 
with the TRNC has failed to promote the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. The paper focuses 
on the idea of sovereignty, which is assumed to be the most crucial contextual condition that 
shapes engagement without recognition. I, therefore, trace the process via which sovereignty 
ideas shape engagement without recognition and how this leads to the failure of conflict 
resolution. The paper adopts a relatively maximalist understanding of conflict resolution, 
which encompasses efforts to achieve an agreement between the different parties (often 
known as conflict settlement) as well efforts to create conditions that are conductive for the 
success of this agreement. In many respects, Cyprus represents a rather typical case for 
exploring this research question. Of all the de facto state- related conflicts that exist today, 
Cyprus is the one with the longest involvement from the side of IOs- the Arab-Israel conflict 
comes close but the intensity of peace-making efforts accelerated later than in Cyprus. What 
is more and unlike Palestine, TRNC’s lack of recognition is far more extensive, which 
suggests further pressures upon IOs to pursue an engagement that will not amount to 
recognition. The paper looks at UN and EU as the main IOs involved in the conflict and the 
de facto state in this case. Following earlier literature on the matter (e.g. Butler 2009, 123), I 
use the term IOs loosely, to also include regional organisations, like the EU.  
Analysis develops in three stages. In the following section, I highlight gaps in the 
study of de facto states and engagement without recognition, while at the same time explain 
in more depth the rest of main concepts of this paper, including sovereignty and how it has 
informed the overall profile and conflict approach of the UN and the EU. I do so by 
reviewing sovereignty-related notions in major texts of each organisation (e.g. UN charter, 
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EU treaties) as well as more conflict-specific strategy texts. Following this, I turn to the main 
analysis of their engagement in Cyprus in two separate sections (one for each organisation), 
where I search documents related to the conflict for similar evidence that helps shed light on 
the way in which each organisation has approached the conflict along sovereignty lines and 
the reasons why such an approach has been adopted. Following this, I trace a link between 
this engagement and the lack of conflict resolution in order to deduct a few potential 
manifestations of this impact that can contribute to the discussion of these types of conflicts. 
In exploring this process through which ideas of sovereignty shape the approach and 
engagement of IOs and, eventually, how this engagement fails to promote conflict resolution, 
I focus on responses from the conflicting parties at the elite level, taking however into 
account the impact of developments in wider politics and society. I analyse a range of official 
documents from the IOs and statements from the conflict parties, and I triangulate findings 
with a re-reading of existing literature and/ or via insights from elite interviews. Finally, in 
the conclusion, I summarise the findings and I elaborate on their relevance to similar 
conflicts, and I suggest avenues for further research.  
I find that sovereignty plays a major role in the approach of the UN and the EU 
towards the Cyprus conflict and the TRNC because of normative pressures and successful 
efforts from the parent state Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to drawn on ideas like sovereignty in 
order to promote its interests. This explanation of the reasons why sovereignty shapes IOs 
approach is important for understanding what is unique about IOs engagement with these 
types of entities and their related conflict. Specifically, it allows to observe how IOs are 
subject to sovereignty- related normative constrains and/or how certain parties to those 
conflicts, especially parent states that enjoy greater international legitimacy, use IOs as 
arenas to promote their aims in the context of the conflict. As a result of those sovereignty 
related dynamics, I find next three distinct ways in which engagement without recognition 
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results in failure of conflict resolution: first, the separatists become more intransigence as a 
result of what they frame as an imbalanced approach of the organisations in favour of the 
parent state. Secondly, the parent state becomes more assertive and inflexible, as a result of 
having the organisations ‘on their side’. Finally, and beyond settlement itself, engagement 
without recognition also undermines reconciliation and the chances to create conditions 
favourable to a successful settlement, e.g. by ensuring even development across both the 
parent state and the de facto state. In line with causal explanations of outcomes, my findings 
about the causes of the failure of conflict resolution do not have any relevance for the 
potential factors that could lead to the opposite outcome, i.e. successful conflict resolution. 
Instead, the paper facilitates the discussion on the range of IOs response to failed secession, 
and especially the impact of sovereignty ideas and the limitations of engagement without 
recognition, which, generally, has been seen in positive light as a way to bypass diplomatic 
hurdles in engaging with de facto states. 
 
Conflict resolution, international organisations and de facto states 
 
As also explained in the introduction, de facto states are hereby defined as state-like entities 
that have declared statehood but this is not recognised by a significant part of the 
international community, measured by the number of recognition from UN members but also 
a range of other ways of international acknowledgement, such as membership of IOs, 
participation to major international events, foreign trade and communications (see also Berg 
and Toomla 2009). Scholars of de facto states have reflected on their characteristics (e.g. 
Geldenhuys 2009, Caspersen 2012), political systems (e.g. Berg and Mölder 2012, Kolstø 
and Blakkisrud 2008), also with regard to conflict resolution (King 2001) or democratisation 
(e.g. Caspersen 2011, Voller 2013). Studies on the relationship between de facto states and 
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other international actors have mostly focused on how the international community has 
reacted to the self-declaration of those entities (e.g. Pegg 1998, Lynch 2004, Musson 2008, 
Fabry 2010, Coggins 2011), the way in which de facto states seek international recognition 
(e.g. Bahcheli et al 2004), why parent states recognise secession (Griffiths 2016) or, in 
opposite scenarios, how they try to prevent their recognition (Ker-Lindsay 2012). More 
recently, a small number of works has looked at the so-called ‘engagement without 
recognition’, which refers to how international actors engage with de facto states in a range 
of political, economic, social and cultural issues but in a way which is different to normal 
diplomatic practice and without recognising independent statehood. The small number of 
works is a result of the fact that this area has only recently attracted scholarly attention, 
although, as we will see later, traces of that type of engagement can be found decades ago in 
cases like Cyprus. Despite the development of a strategy of engagement without recognition 
by the EU (Fischer 2010) and highlighted benefits of this type of engagement by IOs 
(Caspersen and Herrberg 2010), scholarly literature on the matter has mostly focused on 
individual states and their engagement and diplomacy (Cooley and Mitchel 2008, Ker-
Lindsay 2015, Berg and Pegg 2016). Kereselidze (2015) has offered a case-driven assessment 
of EU engagement without recognition in Georgia, while Kyris’ (2015) study of the TRNC 
offers insights into EU engagement, but refrains from making any inferences with regard to 
the link between this type of engagement and conflict resolution and, instead, highlights this 
as an area that merits further research (see also Bouris and Kyris 2017), not least because 
most IOs involvement in areas that host de facto states aims at playing a positive role in the 
related conflict.  
Indeed, de facto state-related conflicts are not an exemption in the effort of IOs to 
promote conflict resolution, especially given the fact that those entities relate to very 
protracted international or regional disputes. Which IO has been involved in which conflict 
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seems to have been informed not only by the objectives of the organisation but also 
geography. In this regard, apart from the UN, which to a lesser or greater degree, has been 
involved in all de facto state-related conflicts (apart from the one between Taiwan and China 
and less so in those of the post-Soviet space, which see a lot of Russian involvement), the 
Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe has mostly involved itself in the many 
conflicts of this type in the post-Soviet space, and so has the EU, as well as in conflicts of the 
broader European neighbourhood (Cyprus, Palestine, Western Sahara), while the African 
Union has naturally concentrated on those closer to home (Western Sahara, Somaliland). The 
ways in which IOs have tried to achieve conflict resolution are many and shaped by their 
very nature. The UN, for example, has focused a lot on peace-keeping and peace-making 
(e.g. Thakur 2010). The EU’s own experience of cooperation and integration as a way to 
overcome and avoid conflict in the post-1945 environment has informed an approach which 
relies a lot on liberal ideas of democracy and interdependence (Visoka and Doyle 2015). 
And yet, it is not difficult to see a link between the presence of de facto states and the 
absence of conflict resolution. All existing de facto states relate to conflicts that remain more 
or less unresolved. This is not surprising given that the resolution of those conflicts seems to 
be synonymous to a change of status for the de facto state, usually towards recognised 
statehood (e.g. South Sudan, East Timor) or the (re)integratiοn of the de facto state into the 
parent state under a variety of arrangements, such as federalism or autonomy (e.g. Biafra, 
Chechnya, for more on this, see Anderson 2011 and Florea 2017). If, therefore, an de facto 
state is still ‘alive’ then the conflict must be too. What is more, the stagnation of the conflict 
despite engagement from the side of IOs suggests an ongoing inability of IOs to promote 
resolution. In this regard, whether and how engagement without recognition fails to promote 
conflict resolution requires more attention. This is the gap that this paper aims to address by 
exploring if and how ideas of sovereignty and their interplay with the lack of international 
7 
recognition, as a main characteristic of de facto states, explain the inability of IOs to 
contribute to the resolution of de facto state-relate conflicts. Because of the nature of many de 
facto state-related conflicts, where often substantial violence has not occurred for many years 
(Cyprus is a very good example of this), it is analytically more valuable to approach 
resolution as both the achievement of an agreement and an end to hostilities. Indeed, this is 
an important distinction made by the literature (e.g. Wallensteen 2015, Ramsbotham et al. 
2016) between conflict settlement and resolution, whereby the former refers more to reaching 
an agreement (see for example Cordell and Wolff 2010), while the later refers to a more 
advanced situation where, in addition, violence has ceased, incompatibles and structural roots 
of the conflict have been addressed. 
 
Enter sovereignty  
 
As a result, conflict resolution scholars tend to look deeper, into the roots of the conflict and 
the literature is mostly concerned with the causes of war, in an effort to eradicate them, the 
dynamics of the conflict, with the hope of changing them, or human needs, with the aim of 
findings ways to satisfy them. In trying to explore the link between IOs engagement and the 
failure to resolve the conflict, this paper looks at sovereignty as a contextual, normative 
dynamic that enables this link. State sovereignty, the idea that a state is defined by a 
functioning government, which is recognised as such and is independent in its authority over 
a territory and a population, is the most fundamental principle of the modern state system 
(see for example Jackson 2007). There is a clear external aspect of sovereignty, which relates 
to international recognition- the single condition that distinguishes de facto states from 
recognised ones. But there is also an internal aspect to sovereignty, which is about de facto 
effective control of the government of the state over its territory and people and, generally, 
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effective economy and political institutions. The focus on sovereignty in exploring the link 
between de facto statehood and conflict resolution is because I consider it to be the most 
fundamental concept when students and practitioners of world politics, especially those that 
work within a state-centric context like intergovernmental IOs, think of statehood (be it 
recognised or not). As such, I expect it to be the most important factor conditioning the way 
in which IOs approach de facto states.3  
Based on conceptualisation of sovereignty above, a review of sovereignty-related 
notions within major UN and EU texts (more specifically: ‘sovereignty’, ‘control’, 
‘independence’, ‘intervention’, ‘recognition’, ‘territory’, ‘authority’) confirms the importance 
of this idea for how IOs approach conflict and de facto states. Starting with the UN, 
sovereignty is one of the most important –if not the most important- principles of the 
organisation. The UN charter introduces the organisation as ‘based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members’ (UN 1945). This foundational principle appears often 
in texts that relate to the approach of the UN towards conflict. The 1999 statement of the 
President of the Security Council on the role of the Security Council in preventing armed 
conflicts opens with the reaffirmation of the commitment to ‘the principles of the political 
independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States’ (UN 1999). This is 
repeated within later conflict-related statements (e.g. in 2000) or resolutions. The interlinked 
issues of independence and territorial integrity as dimensions of sovereignty are also present 
in documents and strategies for specific de facto state-related conflicts, beyond Cyprus, 
which is explored in more detail below. For example, a Secretary General report on Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia (UN 2014) specifically highlights a government’s obligation to ‘invite, 
accept and facilitate international (humanitarian) assistance, in particular if… obstacles, such 
as lack of effective control of parts of the territory, limit its capacity to effectively address all 
3 Analysis here does not aim to offer an authoritative answer on the sovereignty of de facto states but, rather, use 
sovereignty as a conceptual vehicle towards identifying a range of characteristics of these entities that might 
inform international engagement. 
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humanitarian needs’. This is a clear reference to the areas where the de facto administration 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia rather than the Georgian government exercise control and is 
in line with other documents on conflict, such as the 2001 report of the Secretary General on 
the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  
It might come as a surprise that the term sovereignty only makes rare appearances 
within treaties, the most important documents of the EU. It is nowhere to be found in the 
Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community or the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which established the EU. The three major texts that bear a reference to 
sovereignty are the Treaty of Rome, which founded European Economic Communities 
(EEC), the Single European Act and the Constitution for Europe, which was never approved. 
The Treaty of Rome reflected on the establishment of the ECSC a few years earlier as 
signifying how member states ‘relinquished part of their sovereignty, albeit in a limited 
domain’ (coal and steel). The Single European Act’s only mention is on the Commission’s 
responsibility to act on behalf of a state’s sovereign capacity in concluding agreements with 
third parties on exchange of information on nuclear issues. Finally, the reference in the 
Constitution for Europe is even more specific and void of an important political meaning, as 
it links to provisions for fishing- related activities of EU member states in waters under the 
sovereignty of a third country.  
Similarly, major documents relevant to the EU’s strategy towards conflict, such as the 
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (2001), Council’s Conclusions on 
Conflict Prevention (2011) or Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue 
Capacities (2009), bear no references to sovereignty-related terms. Although generally we 
can see a similar absence of terms in documents coming from the Commission’s European 
External Action Services, the EU’s executive arm (e.g. European Commission 2013), the 
recent Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (2016) is an exception: 
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The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states are key elements of the 
European security order. These principles apply to all states, both within and beyond the 
EU’s borders. Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on 
top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European 
security order at its core. The EU will stand united in upholding international law, 
democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country’s right to choose its future freely. 
This extensive discussion of sovereignty alongside Russia’s role in the post-Soviet 
space leaves little doubt that the emphasis put by the EU in the principle emanates from 
developments surrounding the Ukraine crisis. While sovereignty does not play such a 
fundamental role for the EU as it does for the UN, a very typical understanding of 
sovereignty along UN lines as a principle related to the independence and territorial integrity 
of states is clear from the above. As we will see below, the EU’s dealing with the Cyprus 
conflict and its engagement on the ground has been informed by those ideas, if not a bit less 
explicitly in compare to the UN.  
Closing this overview of sovereignty, conflict and IOs, two points must be 
emphasised. First, that sovereignty is linked to a very clear scepticism of the international 
community towards unilateral secession in the post-1945 era and, secondly, that sovereignty 
is a zero-sum game. With reference to the first point, the sovereignty-related principle of state 
territorial integrity has been clearly prioritised by the international community and secession 
has been recognised mostly where there is consent of the parent state (see also Fabry 2010 
and Griffiths 2016). Oppositely, in cases like Ukraine, there has been a lot of resistance 
towards recognising unilateral secession, which, in turn, has created a range of de facto but 
unrecognised states. Secondly, the example of Ukraine and Russia also helps to highlight that 
sovereignty, and its recognition, is a zero-sum game. The EU calling for the respect of 
Ukraine’s sovereignty essentially suggests that Russia cannot exercise sovereignty over areas 
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where Ukraine does. Similarly, one of the major obstacles in some self-declared states being 
diplomatically recognised is that they reside in territories widely regarded as belonging to a 
different, recognised state. This has important implications for how parent and de facto states 
are treated. For example, the government of the Republic of China continued to be 
recognised after its exile in Taiwan in 1949, but states slowly shifted recognition from the 
Republic of China to People’s Republic of China in the mainland, which eventually also 
replaced the Republic of China as a member of the UN. This process illustrates how the 
recognition of two different states as sovereign over the same territory is not probable. The 
example of Cyprus is also illuminative here: states recognise the Greek Cypriot-led Republic 
of Cyprus (RoC) as sovereign over the island, including in the north, and, equally, do not 
recognised the TRNC. Oppositely, only Turkey recognises the TRNC but it does not 
recognise the RoC. As a result, ideas of sovereignty bear relevance to the way in which the 
IOs or other actors see not only de facto states but also parent states, the other major part in 
the conflict. We will see that this becomes crucial in the way IOs (to which often parent 
states are members of) treat de facto states and their conflict. 
 
The UN in Cyprus 
 
Since the fifties, the UN has tried to offer a solution to the Cyprus problem, which started as 
Greek Cypriot anticolonial struggle but soon evolved and still remains a dispute on how 
power and territory is shared between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Greece and 
Turkey also play a role in the dispute by being allies of each community and, particularly 
Turkey has a more direct involvement in the TRNC, which supports in political, economic 
and military terms, including the stationing of troops there. The RoC joined the UN in 
September 1960 as a bi-communal state but failure of the two communities to cooperate 
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gradually led to territorial and administrative separation between a Greek Cypriot-dominated 
RoC in the south and the Turkish Cypriots in the north, under a separate administration. 
When Turkish Cypriot declare themselves independent first in 1975 and more formally in 
1983, they argued that by establishing a separate state they facilitate a resolution based on a 
federation between their state and a Greek Cypriot state. Yet, neither that nor the fact that the 
RoC was now run by Greek Cypriots only made any difference to the international 
community, which outrightly rejected the declaration of a state in the island other than the 
Republic. The same remains today and this persistent approach can be tracked throughout the 
years in which the UN has engaged in Cyprus along the lines of both peace-making, through 
various efforts to find a solution to the dispute under the auspices of the office of the 
Secretary General, complemented by the UNDP or UNHCR, as well as peacekeeping, via the 
UNFICYP mission, which, since 1964 aims to safeguard ceasefire and assist peace- making.  
A range of UN documents provide evidence for this approach. Resolution 186, which 
inter alia established UNFICYP, makes a reference to the UN charter (see earlier) and calls 
all UN members to ‘refrain from any action or threat of action to worsen the situation in the 
sovereign (my emphasis) RoC’. This is a clear reference to the fact that Turkey had been 
assisting financially and militarily the Turkish Cypriots since the onset of their separation in 
enclaves in the sixties. Of particular interest are later resolutions that deal with Turkish 
Cypriot efforts to establish a separate state. In 1975, resolution 367 renewed calls for the 
respect of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and regretted that “a 
part of the RoC would become ‘a Federated Turkish State’”. In 1983, when the TRNC was 
declared to replace the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus until today, this resolution was 
reaffirmed, secession was deplored, declaration of independence was deemed invalid and UN 
members were called to not recognise any other state in the island rather than the RoC 
(resolution 541). To this day, those resolutions represent foundations of the UN’s approach to 
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the conflict. 
This UN approach towards the Cyprus problem and the TRNC can be explained in 
two main ways. Firstly, Greek Cypriots, as representatives of the RoC, were able to use their 
membership of the organisation to shape the engagement of the UN towards fitting their 
objectives in the conflict. Many of the aforementioned resolutions, which called for the 
respect of RoC’s sovereignty, were a result of complaints by the Greek Cypriots. However, it 
should not be assumed that the instrumental use of membership by Greek Cypriots alone 
explains the way in which the UN approached conflict. Research has shown that the UN was 
able to resist Greek Cypriot pressures in certain instances, such as pressure to introduce 
UNFICYP as a mission working closely with the RoC (Ker-Lindsay 2001). In this sense, UN 
insistence to a clear rejection of the TRNC’s legitimacy can be interpreted more as a result of 
the UN’s broader adherence to sovereignty -the very foundational principle of the 
organisation. Confirming this finding is an important body of literature that has found a rather 
deep aversion of the UN to unilateral secession in fear of setting a precedent (see also earlier 
but also, for example, Wallensteen 2015).  
This UN approach greatly impacted their engagement with the conflict and the 
Turkish Cypriots in particular and here we can see early traces of what in more recent years 
has come to be known as engagement without recognition. In peace-making efforts, the UN 
treat Turkish Cypriots as a ‘community’ with a ‘leader’ rather than a ‘President of the 
TRNC’. By using these terms, the UN can engage whilst minimising any recognition 
consequences. Interestingly and unlike what we see in the case of the EU (see below), the 
UN, despite not challenging the legitimacy of the RoC, has chosen to use the terms 
‘leadership’ and ‘community’ also when referring to the Greek Cypriot side. This approach 
has allowed the UN to bring both sides to the table of negotiations, but it does not mean that 
it has managed to bypass recognition-related challenges all together (see below). Since 1964, 
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the UN has supplemented peace-making with peacekeeping efforts through the UNFICYP 
that aims to safeguard the ceasefire between the two sides. Peacekeeping efforts have not 
substantially been impacted by issues of recognition, although the RoC enjoys a more direct 
involvement with the mission, for example as a main financial contributor. Finally, the UN 
has also worked via the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), first in order to provide relief for internal refugees and 
technical/ financial assistance respectively but later towards projects of inter-communal 
cooperation. In the context of those activities the UN has had to engage with the Turkish 
Cypriot administration and its authorities. Related documents speak of ‘concerned 
authorities’, in a similar fashion to what we can see in other de facto states (UN 2014), and of 
activities that benefit the ‘whole island’ (Hocknell 2001).  
These elements of engagement without recognition in the UN’s approach have 
undermined both the chances of achieving an agreement but also the broader promotion of 
reconciliation and measures that can help a successful implementation of an agreement. UN’s 
approach has actually led to more intransigence on the Turkish Cypriot side, which has had a 
negative impact on settlement efforts. This can be seen by the Turkish Cypriot reaction 
towards the UN throughout the years. The first UN peace-making effort under Galo Plaza 
after the breakdown of the RoC in 1964 failed largely because Turkish Cypriots mistrusted 
the UN as siding with the Greek Cypriots – a reaction to the way in which the UN engaged 
while recognising RoC’s legitimacy. Besides, the fact the RoC makes a substantial 
contribution to the funding of the UNFICYP has also been suggested as a source of Turkish 
Cypriot and Turkish mistrust towards the UN (Richmond 2001, 84). In addition, the very 
establishment of the TRNC in 1983, which drove the two sides further apart for at least a 
decade, was linked by the then Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to the fact that the UN 
treated the Greek Cypriot- dominated RoC as the only legitimate government of Cyprus, 
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despite that the once established bi-communal government did not see Turkish Cypriot 
participation anymore (Youtube 2017). During the nineties and in the lead up to the Annan 
Plan, the UN-proposed plan for the reunification of Cyprus under a federation, Denktash 
insisted that the TRNC is recognised for negotiations to progress. Annan’s report on his 
missions of good offices perfectly illuminates how UN’s engagement without recognition 
caused intransigence on the Turkish Cypriot side and did not allow conflict resolution efforts 
to bear fruits: 
the key obstacle to negotiation was the status issue. Mr. Denktash argued that the 
Turkish Cypriot side was disadvantaged by the recognition enjoyed by the RoC and 
the non-recognition of the “TRNC”. He blamed Security Council resolutions for this 
situation, and said that those resolutions inevitably tied me and my Special Adviser to 
an approach which [ …] could not be truly impartial, and which ignored the “realities” 
[…] Despite my best efforts, I was never able to convince Mr. Denktash that the 
“realities” of the Cyprus problem were not only the realities on the ground but the 
realities of international law and international Politics (UN Security Council 2003)'. 
 
Interestingly, Denktash was eventually side-lined, as a pro-solution wave swept across north 
Cyprus. I explore to what extent this undermines the link between intransigence caused by 
IOs engagement without recognition and failure to resolve the conflict in the conclusion. The 
ongoing mistrust of the UN and the barrier it raises towards resolution was also confirmed in 
the aftermath of the failure of 2017 talks in Crans Montana, when Turkish Cypriot leadership 
suggested that ‘problems could not be overcome “by repeating the old methodologies” 
(Cyprus Mail 2017), while Turkey called for solutions outside UN-supported parameters 
(Cyprus Mail 2017b), as well as previous explicit or implicit efforts of the Turkish Cypriots 
to move negotiations outside UN parameters (e.g. UN Security Council 2004). 
Turkish Cypriots have been more intransigent not only because of the UN and their 
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engagement without recognition, but also because of how Greek Cypriots have 
instrumentally used their UN membership to shape this engagement. This is a less direct way 
in which sovereignty impacts on the ability of the UN to facilitate an agreement (in the sense 
that it is not part but rather a reason for engagement without recognition). However, it is also 
important to note that the ability of the RoC to use the UN to promote its aims has led to 
inflexible negotiating positions not only in the de facto state (Turkish Cypriots) but also the 
parent state itself (Greek Cypriots), for example in the early phases of peace-making in the 
sixties (Richmond 2001, 106). During the nineties, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Confidence 
Building Measures were not implemented, also because Greek Cypriots feared that some of 
those measures, which aimed at easing the embargo against the Turkish Cypriots, might 
amount to recognition of the TRNC (Newman 2001, 142). This has continued throughout the 
years and, as we will see below, the comparatively greater legitimacy of the RoC in 
international politics can also be seen as a reason that motivated the majority of Greek 
Cypriot elites and the public to reject the Annan Plan in 2004.  
While all this antagonism obviously does not help the chances of reconciliation and 
conflict resolution in general, engagement without recognition seems to have also 
compromised a range of specific UN-supported activities that could be helpful for 
reconciliation between the two communities and, therefore, the success of a potential peace 
deal. For example, and due to the difficulty to engage with authorities in the north, UNDP 
encouraged more the development of the RoC. This meant that an equal picture of 
development across the island, which could help the success of reunification, was not 
possible. What is more, this undermined the Turkish Cypriots’ trust in the UN further. 
However, literature has suggested that issues of recognition might be more compatible with 
engagement that is less political in nature, such as with civil society (Kyris 2013, Berg and 
Pegg 2016), and this seems to have been the case with some activities of the UNDP, such as 
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the efforts on missing persons (see also Hocknell 2001), UNHCR bi-communal projects (see 
also Demetriou 2001) as well as EU activities (see later) that might be positive for conflict 
resolution. I return to this point in the conclusion. 
 
The EU in Cyprus 
 
In comparison to the UN, the EU has not focused on conflict settlement but more on creating 
conditions that are conductive to the success of reunification. Nevertheless, the EU’s 
engagement in northern Cyprus is far more complex in many respects. This can be tracked 
back to the 2004 EU accession of a divided island. Despite being supported by the Turkish 
Cypriots, reunification based on the Annan Plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in the 
April 2004 referendums. This meant that the plan was never implemented and that, a month 
later, Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided country. As a result, while the entire country is 
part of the EU, EU law implementation is suspended in the northern part of the island. This 
has been enshrined in Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty, which effectively recognised the 
RoC’s sovereignty over the entire island, by referring to north Cyprus as ‘areas of the RoC in 
which the government of the RoC does not exercise effective control’.  
This provision has fundamentally shaped the EU’s approach and engagement with the 
north for both political and practical reasons. Practically, the EU needed to make sure that EU 
law applies to the de facto border that separates the northern areas controlled by the TRNC 
and those areas controlled by the RoC. This was to be done through the Green Line 
Regulation. With both communities still formally committed to reunification there was also a 
practical necessity to assist Turkish Cypriots with preparing for EU law implementation, 
when a reunification will extend application of acquis also in the north. This was to be done 
via the Financial Aid Regulation. At a much clearer political level, the instruments proposed 
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by the Commission was a response to the Council, which, following the referenda on the 
Annan Plan, but, crucially, before the RoC joined the EU and was able to exert influence on 
decisions stated:  
‘the Turkish Cypriot community have expressed their clear desire for a future within 
the EU. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the 
economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Council invited the 
Commission to bring forward comprehensive proposals to this end’. 
 
As a result, the Green Line regulation inter alia aims at Turkish Cypriot economic 
development. Secondly, the Financial Aid Regulation (European Council 2006) has far more 
explicit links to the EU’s effort to play a positive role in the Cyprus conflict as it aims to  
‘facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of 
the Turkish Cypriot community, with particular emphasis on the economic integration 
of the island and on improving contact between the two communities and with the 
EU’. 
 
Here too, however, the EU was clear that ‘nothing in this Regulation is intended to imply 
recognition of any public authority in the areas other than the government of the RoC’. 
Finally, the Commission also prepared a proposal for the Direct Trade Regulation, a 
preferential trade agreement between the EU and the Turkish Cypriots.  
While in a less obvious way in compare to the UN, sovereignty seem to have shaped 
also EU’s approach towards Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots. Not too dissimilarly to what 
we see in the case of UN engagement, this seems to be a result of both normative pressures as 
well as the actions of the parent state RoC. All three regulations were prepared by the 
Commission in response to the Council’s recommendation before the parent state RoC was 
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able to exert influence within the EU organs. This, in relation to the historical context of the 
era, which favoured Turkish Cypriots as a result of their positive vote in the Annan Plan, 
resulted in some modestly ambitious proposals for engagement. However, after accession, 
RoC has been most vocal and active in terms of safeguarding their sovereignty in relation to 
EU’s involvement in the area. The Direct Trade regulation was quickly blocked by the Greek 
Cypriots and, to this day, has not been implemented. The rationale of Greek Cypriots for 
vetoing the regulation is that trade with the Turkish Cypriots will amount to recognition of 
the TRNC ‘by implication’. Instead, the Green Line and Financial Aid Regulations were 
approved but both their content and their implementation have been seriously impacted by 
issues of sovereignty and recognition and the engagement without recognition has come with 
certain challenges (see also below). This sequence of events suggests that the absence of a 
parent state from the organisation might allow some more flexibility in developing a more 
substantial engagement with the de facto state. However, as we will see below and by looking 
at the period before RoC joined the EU, this is not to suggest that an IO without a parent state 
will adopt a more positive approach towards the separatists.  
Indeed, the EU has always rejected the legitimacy of the TRNC and here we can see 
normative pressures playing again a role on how adamant the EU has been to recognise 
RoC’s sovereignty and treat Turkish Cypriots accordingly. This is confirmed by the fact that 
the EU’s stance towards Cyprus was linked to sovereignty far earlier than the RoC was about 
to join and influence it. We can find evidence of this in the 1974 communication issued by 
the European Political Cooperation, the then organ for EU’s foreign relations, following the 
coup against Greek Cypriot President Makarios and the resulting war with Turkey, which 
reaffirmed the support for ‘the independence and the territorial integrity and independence of 
Cyprus [and] opposition to any intervention or interference tending to put it in question’ 
(Kyris 2015, 39). A year later, the same body further underlined this commitment and 
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specifically referred to UN resolutions on the matter (Archive of European Integration 2017). 
While the EU continued to confirm RoC’s sovereignty over the years (e.g. by denouncing the 
establishment of the TRNC in 1983), the statements during the seventies bear significant 
analytical value as they suggest that they were not a result of pressures within the 
organisation from neither the Greek Cypriot-led RoC nor its alliance Greece, which only later 
became members of the EU.  
The Green Line regulation objective to promote the economic development of 
Turkish Cypriots, which as we saw before is linked to a future, smooth implementation of a 
resolution agreement, has been hampered by issues of recognition. For example, the 
Commission notes that the fact that the RoC does not recognise TRNC documents for 
Turkish Cypriot buses and lories impedes their access to the RoC-controlled areas and, 
ultimately, Turkish Cypriot economic development (European Commission 2010, 8). The 
issue of recognition has compromised even more the implementation of the Financial Aid 
Regulation, including efforts to assist the success of reunification by preparing the Turkish 
Cypriots for implementing EU law, which, for the Greek Cypriots are the most controversial 
(EU official, personal communication, 15 April 2016). A major report (European Court of 
Auditors 2012) found the lack of recognition as one of the main challenges in implementing 
the regulation, something the Commission confirmed. For example, and because the TRNC is 
not recognised, the EU was not able to use the twinning instrument, which is based on the 
consultation between candidates and EU member states in order to share ‘know-how’ for 
reforms and is the EU’s typical capacity building programmes towards EU law 
harmonisation. Where different agencies were deployed, those were not able to properly 
work with Turkish Cypriot authorities either (European Court of Auditors 2012, 2). Besides, 
the same report also questions the extent to which liability of EU-funded projects can be 
transferred to the de facto TRNC authorities.  
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In many respects, therefore, the EU has failed to fully meet their conflict resolution- 
related objectives, i.e. create conditions that will assist the implementation of a future 
agreement and promote reconciliation. The Green Line Regulation might have helped a 
growth in Turkish Cypriots trade with the Greek Cypriots but this is far from the ambitious 
aims that the EU set for itself. This is not only because of the problems that recognition 
creates for the Green Line Regulation but mostly because, the EU has not found a way to 
bypass Greek Cypriot objections towards the implementation of Direct Trade Regulation, 
which would have been much more important in terms of economic development and 
addressing the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. In addition, the very slow progress in EU 
law preparation due to issues of recognition also means that the EU is far from creating 
conditions conductive for the success of a settlement. The EU has found promoting 
reconciliation amongst civil society easier. This is similar to what we saw with UNDP earlier 
and I return to this point in the conclusion.  
Very much in the same vein with what we see in the case of the UN, the EU’s 
engagement without recognition has also created inflexibility in the de facto state and this 
signifies another dimension of the EU’s failure to assist conflict resolution and reaching an 
agreement. The EU’s approach to recognise RoC as legitimate was behind the very decision 
of the EU to open accession negotiations with the RoC alone, which led to one of the worst 
periods in terms of inter-communal relations, with the Turkish Cypriot leadership repeatedly 
condemning the EU and attacking the validity of the accession process.4 Years later, even 
moderate Turkish Cypriots elites continue to refer back to the decision to start and conclude 
negotiations with RoC alone as a reason for Turkish Cypriot’s mistrust and defensive reaction 
towards the EU (Turkish Cypriot official, personal communication, 9 September 2009). More 
4 See for example the Turkey-TRNC Joint Declaration 28 December 1995, available at: 
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-trnc-joint-declarationdecember-28_-1995.En.Mfa> [Accessed 27 August 2017] 
Turkish Cypriot Memorandum addressed to the Council Of Ministers of the European Communities in respect 
of an ‘Application’ For Membership By ‘The Republic Of Cyprus’. 
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recently, the fact that engagement without recognition has not allowed the EU to meet 
‘promises’ (personal communication with various Turkish Cypriot officials, May 2009, 
September 2009 and April 2016) of helping the economic development of Turkish Cypriots 
and address their isolation has created waves of frustration. While no definite evidence can be 
found as to whether this has been behind the failure to reach an agreement during the latest 
round of talks that ended in 2017 (this years-long round was the first major effort since EU 
engagement began), the fact that the Turkish Cypriot elites see the EU as partial to Greek 
Cypriots is rather clear and suggests that the EU and its engagement itself have failed to 
assist the resolution of the conflict, including in recent years. For example, the EU’s move to 
introduce an ad hoc committee during the latest inter-communal peace talks was met by 
scepticism by some Turkish Cypriot elites, who feared this might allow Greek Cypriots to 
control the process of EU law harmonization (Turkish Cypriot officials, personal 
communication, 14 April 2016). Besides, the way in which RoC has been able to use their 
EU membership in the context of the conflict has been more aggressive in comparison to the 
way they have used the UN as a platform and this has frustrated Turkish Cypriots further 
both at the elite and the public level.5 Finally, this ability of the RoC to use the EU as a 
platform to further their interests has naturally led to more Greek Cypriot inflexibility too. 
Perhaps the best example of this is how Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos in 2004 
framed the rejection of the Annan Plan as a way to allow the RoC join the EU alone and by 
that fortify its position as the recognised sovereign government and strengthen its hand in 
diplomacy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
5 At the elite level, my personal communication with a range of Turkish Cypriot elites confirms this. At the 
society level, the decreasing positive image of the EU amongst Turkish Cypriots (see Eurobarometer) can also 
be seen as an indication. 
23 
                                                                
The study of Cyprus and the TRNC has shown a rather clear link between the idea of 
sovereignty and engagement without recognition, and then a resulting failure of this UN and 
EU engagement to promote the resolution of the conflict. It has become evident that both 
organisations support the legitimacy of the parent state, here the RoC, against the de facto 
state, here the TRNC. In both cases of IOs, this way in which sovereignty has shaped the 
approach towards the conflict is informed by two factors. First, the ability of the parent state 
to use the IO to promote and cement its recognition as the sovereign in the area vis a vis the 
de facto state. Yet, structural characteristics of the UN (i.e. the fact Turkey is a member and 
RoC is not a member of the Security Council) have allowed the organisation to curtail the 
extent to which Greek Cypriots can instrumentally use their membership and, instead, have 
offered some room to the representation of Turkish Cypriot views, e.g. by allowing them to 
address the Security Council or by Turkey being a channel via which Turkish Cypriot interest 
can be promoted. Indeed, the imbalance of power in the EU is much greater in compare to 
UN. The RoC is treated as the only representative of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots have not 
been allowed to address EU organs. Lacking EU membership, Turkey has not been able to 
promote Turkish Cypriot interests either. Having said this, sovereignty as a principle of 
international relations seems to be more important as an explanation of IOs approach towards 
de facto state-related conflicts. We saw that even in instances where the parent state cannot 
influence the IO (e.g. EU before the accession of the RoC), a commitment to sovereignty 
suggests that the organisation will be inclined in favour of the parent state and against the 
secessionists regardless. Besides, the way in which sovereignty continues to shape the 
approach of the EU, despite the principle not being constitutionally important, allows us to 
assume that something similar might be happening with other IOs. More research on this 
matter will shed light on potential variations.   
Next, analysis focused on this sovereignty-rooted engagement without recognition 
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and its impact. In the case of the UN, I found a comparatively more substantial engagement 
(e.g. in the context of the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the UN talks vis-a-vis the 
way the EU works with TRNC authorities far less and less openly). However, in both cases 
the IOs have been explicit that their engagement does not suggest any recognition of the self-
declared TRNC. Coming to the impact of this engagement on the conflict, we can also note 
some important similarities. In terms of conflict settlement, the engagement without 
recognition from both the UN and the EU seems to have led to intransigence in both sides, 
therefore undermining the chances of achieving an agreement. The parent state, protected 
behind the recognition that enjoys from the international community, becomes more 
assertive. In a sort of vicious circle, secessionists also become inflexible as a reaction to the 
way in which the parent state uses the IO to promote own aims. Besides, the de facto state 
becomes more inflexible also as a result of frustration with the lack of recognition and related 
mistrust towards the IO. This increased intransigence in both sides does not allow an 
agreement to be reached, and we explored a range of settlement efforts that failed to produce 
results. In terms of broader conflict resolution, engagement without recognition has often 
failed to create conditions necessary for the success of a potential settlement, such as 
fostering an even development, which has been the aim of both UNDP and some EU 
activities. Limitations are particularly significant for the role of the EU, which, rather than 
being explicitly peace-making like the UN, only aims to create conditions necessary for an 
agreement to succeed within an EU framework. The way in which engagement without 
recognition has unravelled has meant that the objectives of the EU, such as encouraging the 
economic development of the Turkish Cypriots or preparing them for applying EU law, have 
not been fully met. The type of engagement and the limitations that come with it have further 
frustrated the Turkish Cypriot elites and the public, something that is not conductive to 
settlement efforts either. 
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In this regard, the example of Cyprus has offered some valuable lessons for 
understanding similar conflicts and the way in which they are impacted by the reaction of the 
international community and IOs in particular. Based on this paper, evidence of the failure of 
IOs engagement without recognition to promote conflict resolution, include intransigence in 
one or more sides of the conflict and an inability of the organisation to create conditions 
favourable to the success of a settlement. For a conflict to remain unresolved, one side’s 
intransigence is enough. This became evident in 2004 when resolution was not possible 
because of Greek Cypriot intransigence and despite Turkish Cypriots approval of the 
agreement. However, more research needs to be done on the matter and, particularly, on 
cases of successful agreements, which did not manage to bring the resolution of the conflict 
as a result of the failure of IOs to create conditions favourable to their success- this might 
help us understanding whether overcoming intransigence across all conflict parties is enough 
or whether a deeper level of conflict resolution efforts, such as those from the EU or the 
UNDP in Cyprus, is necessary.  
It needs to be emphasised that, in line with causal analysis of outcomes, my findings 
on the causes of the failure of conflict resolution do not have any relevance for the potential 
factors that could lead to the opposite scenario, i.e. successful conflict resolution. For 
example, the conclusion that engagement without recognition leads to failure of conflict 
resolution should not suggest that a different approach, such as full-on engagement, will 
necessarily be better for conflict resolution. Rather, the objective here has been to specify 
certain limitations to conflict resolution. Yet, a preliminary finding here was that IOs tend to 
find easier to engage in less political projects and these then form part of their engagement 
without recognition. Interestingly, those efforts seem to have better chances of success. 
Although not at the heart of our analysis, which focuses on limitations of conflict resolution, 
this is a potentially important finding for understanding opportunities that exist in the context 
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of engagement without recognition. The short life of many of EU reconciliation initiatives 
due to the inability to plan long term in a such volatile political climate (see also Kyris 2015) 
casts a doubt over the extent to which this type of IOs programmes can contribute to 
resolution. However, more research on this front will help discover the extent to which 
alternative forms of engagement can promote conflict resolution. More broadly, more 
research is needed into the variations of response from the international community and IOs 
to secession efforts, beyond engagement without recognition, and the extent to which they 
relate to specific outcomes in the conflict, including failure or success of resolution.  
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